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Introduction
Welfare reform is high on the political agenda in both  
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In New Zealand an 
independent welfare working group has released its final 
report and the prime minister, John Key, signalled that 
the government would consider its findings. In the United 
Kingdom the secretary of state for work and pensions, Iain 
Duncan Smith, has outlined plans to radically reduce the cost 
and complexity of working-aged benefits and to increase the 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of services. 
This article compares welfare reform in New Zealand and the 
UK. Such a comparison is of interest given the similar social 
policy traditions in the two countries and similarities and 
differences in the approaches taken to their welfare reforms. 
There are also important lessons – on what to do and on 
what not to do – that the countries can learn from each other.
The context for welfare reform
Welfare reform needs to be considered in 
its broader social and economic context. 
This is important for, at the very least, 
shaping the quantum of resources that 
can be committed to welfare spending. 
Measures such as GDP per capita1 and 
rankings of global competitiveness2 
highlight how both New Zealand and the 
UK face challenges in ensuring that per 
capita incomes and relative living standards 
grow at rates comparable to those of other 
similar countries (such as Australia and 
Germany). This relative performance has 
a bearing on the resources available for 
redistribution (the dynamic size of the tax 
base and labour market). A fall in relative 
living standards may also create pressure 
to inflate incomes through borrowing or 
poorly targeted spending (Nolan, 2011).3
Public spending is lower (as a share 
of GDP) in New Zealand than in the 
UK. This partly reflects the UK’s larger 
exposure to the global financial crisis 
(due to both the size of the financial 
sector and failures in the UK’s approach 
to financial regulation), but it also reflects 
a large increase in spending before this. 
Between 2001 and 2007 (prior to the 
financial crisis) public spending in the 
UK rose from 36% to 41% of GDP (and 
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reached 48% of GDP in 2010) (Osborne, 
2010). The health budget doubled in real 
terms between 1999 and 2010 and the 
welfare budget doubled between 1990 and 
2010. The failure to combine this increase 
in spending with adequate supply-side 
reform (especially in areas like health) 
meant that much of the increase was 
absorbed in increased costs of delivering 
services rather than improved outcomes 
(Haldenby et al., 2009).
In New Zealand the increase in 
spending over this period was more 
moderate, from 31% to 34% of GDP 
between the turn of the century and 2010 
(Whitehead, 2010), potentially reflecting 
the greater control over expenditure 
following the introduction of the Public 
Finance Act 1989 and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act 1994. There was, however, concern 
over public service productivity and 
the increase in tax burdens due to 
fiscal drag. There was also concern that 
the inflationary impact of increases in 
spending in New Zealand contributed to 
the country entering recession prior to 
the global financial crisis (NZIER, 2007). 
New Zealand’s public finances were 
nonetheless on a stronger footing going 
into the crisis than those of the UK.
Both countries need to improve the 
quality of public spending. Achieving 
better outcomes is not simply a question 
of spending more but requires spending 
in better ways. Welfare must be central 
to this value-for-money agenda. In 
both countries welfare is the largest 
area of spending. In the UK the 2010 
welfare budget (including departmental 
spending) was £218 billion (16% of 
GDP and 32% of government spending 
(Bassett et al., 2010)), which was twice 
what was spent on the health system. In 
New Zealand the figures were smaller but 
still significant, with welfare spending 
($21.2 billion, or 10% of GDP and 30% 
of core Crown expenses (English, 2010)) 
being equivalent to one and a half times 
the spending on health.
Welfare spending
Both countries have seen large increases 
in welfare spending over recent years. 
Some welfare spending varies with 
economic conditions, with increasing 
unemployment, for example, leading 
to greater expenditure on assistance 
to support people back into work 
(the automatic stabilisers). Yet in both 
countries over recent years spending on 
welfare has been increasing even when the 
economy was growing. There have been 
two drivers of this increase.
The first driver was increased spending 
on programmes designed to make work 
pay, such as the Working for Families tax 
credits in New Zealand and the working 
tax credit in the UK. It was hoped that 
by encouraging work these programmes 
would reduce child poverty and the 
overall costs of welfare. These programmes 
improved the incentives to work facing sole 
earners, but also meant that incentives for 
second earners in households to work were 
reduced. They also helped reduce child 
poverty,4 but this approach of ‘spending to 
save’ did not succeed in reducing the cost 
of welfare.
The second driver was the increased 
spending on ‘middle-class welfare’ 
(spending on middle- to higher-income 
families). In New Zealand this included 
the extension to the Working for 
Families programme after 2005 and the 
introduction of an independent earner tax 
credit after 2008.5 The extension of middle-
class welfare in the UK since 1997 has been 
more extensive, with Labour introducing 
13 new benefits after they came into 
power.6 Many of these benefits lacked any 
real rationale (beyond simply attracting 
votes). This included the establishment 
of a universal winter fuel allowance for 
pensioners, which in 2010 cost £2.7 billion 
and of which 88% went to people not in 
fuel poverty (Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Select Committee, 2009).
It is sometimes argued that spending 
on middle-class welfare is an important 
part of generating support for spending 
on the poor. Reform research has 
questioned whether this is the case 
(Cawston, Haldenby and Nolan, 2009, 
2010). An increase in middle-class welfare 
tends to crowd out spending on the poor, 
with political incentives meaning that the 
wrong type of support tends to increase in 
value. Increased spending on middle-class 
welfare also undermines the legitimacy of 
a welfare system. Reform research on the 
British Social Attitudes Survey has shown, 
for example, that as spending on middle-
class welfare increased in the UK from 
1997 the public support for working-
aged benefits for people out of work fell 
(Nolan, 2011).
A need for a clearer focus on 
priorities is important in both countries 
given the risks of increasing long-term 
unemployment arising from recent 
economic shocks, such as the global 
financial crisis and the 2011 Canterbury 
earthquake. Spending must be prioritised 
not only within the welfare budget, but 
also between this and other budgets. When 
government finances and tax revenue 
are limited, there is a trade-off between 
spending on welfare and departmental 
and infrastructure spending. Research by 
Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2008) has 
found that the return (in terms of growth) 
from spending on social protection (such 
as welfare and health) tends to be lower 
than spending on economic development 
(such as infrastructure) and education. 
This finding is consistent across studies 
and holds for both developed and 
developing countries.
A need for a clearer focus on priorities 
is also important given the changing 
demographic profile of the populations in 
the two countries. Increasing dependency 
ratios mean that in the absence of reform 
the costs of current welfare policy will 
escalate rapidly. A start has been made 
with managing the costs of pensions 
An increase in middle-class welfare tends to crowd 
out spending on the poor, with political incentives 
meaning that the wrong type of support tends to 
increase in value. 
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in New Zealand, with contributions 
(currently suspended) being made to 
prefunding the costs of New Zealand 
Superannuation and the introduction of 
(heavily subsidised) personal retirement 
accounts. However, the ring fencing of 
New Zealand Superannuation, the cost of 
the KiwiSaver subsidies, the level of the 
state pension age and managing the long-
term costs of health and long-term care 
require further debate.
In contrast, in the UK, while the debate 
on long-term care has been prolonged 
(although there is still political reluctance 
to commit to a funding framework) the 
debate on managing the cost of pension 
commitments is less developed than in 
New Zealand. Indeed, although some 
changes in the treatment of public 
sector pensions have been made, it is 
proposed to encourage contributions to 
individual retirement accounts (National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST)) 
through auto-enrolment, and a proposed 
increase in the retirement age has been 
brought forward, the government remains 
largely in denial about the need to reduce 
the longer term cost of state pensions 
(and has actually significantly increased 
these costs through changing the basis 
for indexation).
‘21st Century Welfare’
In the UK the Coalition government has 
made welfare reform (under the banner of 
‘21st Century Welfare’) a central feature of 
its policy agenda. Key reforms are shown 
in the box, and the three most important 
features are discussed below.
The flagship feature of these reforms 
is the proposed introduction of a 
universal credit. This proposal, similar to 
the single core benefit proposals of the 
fifth Labour government in New Zealand 
(Sainsbury and Stephens, 2009), would 
represent a significant simplification of 
the income transfer system. However, 
while simplification is the right goal, the 
universal credit is the wrong fix (Work 
and Pensions Committee, 2011, qn 17):
• The reforms place a lot of emphasis 
on the ability of smart automation 
to update changes in circumstances 
in real time. Experience shows how 
difficult it can be to accurately 
monitor fluctuations in income and 
adjust levels of assistance. Further, not 
all important criteria for determining 
assistance can easily be automated 
without incurring significant 
administration and compliance 
costs.7
• There has been a lack of thought given 
to implementation of the reforms. 
There are important outstanding 
issues relating to the treatment of 
disability benefits, housing benefits 
and child support programmes.
• The approach of increasing the 
amount that can be earned before 
benefit abatement begins does not 
reward the right decisions. There will be 
a large increase in disincentives to work 
facing second earners in households, 
which was not recognised in the white 
paper proposing these reforms.
The Coalition’s welfare agenda also 
includes the introduction of the work 
programme. This programme built 
on successful reforms introduced by 
the previous Labour government. It 
aims to engage private and third sector 
organisations in the delivery of welfare-
to-work services. This is based on a new 
approach to contracting which aims to 
ensure that providers are paid out of the 
savings from reduced benefit payments. 
Getting these contracts to work will 
be difficult and there is a challenge in 
ensuring that there are enough contractors 
who can bring sufficient balance sheet 
strength to the table.
The Coalition also proposes to shift 
people on incapacity benefits onto the 
employment and support allowance, 
which is more focused on assessing 
capacity to work. Existing incapacity 
benefit recipients will be required to 
undertake a new work test. For some 
beneficiaries the benefit will also be time 
limited. This process began under the 
previous Labour government and was 
motivated by a concern that too large a 
proportion of the population is on these 
benefits, with benefit numbers being 
equivalent to around 9% of the number 
of people over 15 in work. There was 
also concern that rather than changes 
in need, such as a higher incidence of 
disability among an increasingly elderly 
population, this increase reflected a 
tendency for benefit-switching (people 
Key UK welfare 
proposals
•	 Universal	credit:	replace	all	
means-tested benefits and tax 
credits for those of a working 
age with a single benefit from 
2013.
•	 The	work	programme:	combine	
existing welfare-to-work 
programmes into one scheme 
which funds providers out of 
benefit savings.
•	 Employment	and	support	
allowance (ESA): shift incapacity 
benefit recipients onto the 
ESA, time-limit some payments 
and introduce a stronger work 
capability assessment (medical 
test).
•	 Child	benefit:	freeze	benefit	
for three years and withdraw 
assistance from families 
containing a higher-rate 
taxpayer.
•	 Child	and	working	tax	credits:	
increase rate at which tax 
credits are withdrawn (from 
39% to 41%) and taper the 
family element of the child tax 
credit immediately after the 
child element is exhausted; 
above-inflation increases in the 
per-child element of the child 
tax credit in 2011 and 2012.
•	 Housing	benefit:	set	local	
housing allowance at the 30 
percentile of rents in a local 
area (rather than the median) 
and introduce a nationwide cap 
on the level of payment.
•	 Benefit	indexation:	link	benefits	
and tax credits with the 
consumer prices index (CPI) 
rather than the retail prices 
index (RPI) or Rossi index.
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moving from other benefits) to avoid the 
greater conditionality of other benefits.
Possible lessons from the UK
Debates on the proposed welfare reforms 
in the UK highlight a number of potential 
lessons for welfare reform in New 
Zealand. An important lesson is that it 
is inevitable that any policy change will 
involve trade-offs. These trade-offs are 
often referred to as an iron triangle (when 
it is impossible to simultaneously improve 
fiscal cost, incentives to work and poverty 
reduction), but even within objectives 
(such as making work pay) trade-offs are 
required. In the case of the universal credit, 
for example, increasing the amount that 
a person can earn before facing benefit 
abatement would mean that some people 
will face improved incentives to work a 
small number of hours a week, but other 
people would be encouraged to reduce 
their hours of work or to stop working all 
together. There is no silver bullet and it is 
impossible to make work pay for everyone 
at every time.
This need for trade-offs has two 
implications. First, welfare policy needs 
to recognise that families must take 
some responsibility themselves. In the 
real world there is no perfect welfare 
system where at every point work always 
pays, all in-work costs are covered and 
change never creates ‘losers’. There are at 
times, for example, costs associated with 
working that no realistic welfare system 
could ever compensate for. But this 
should not be used as an excuse when 
families fail to make decisions that are in 
their – and society’s – long-term interests. 
The flipside of having a welfare system 
which provides an important social safety 
net is that most people can reasonably be 
expected to take up work if it is available 
and adequate.
The Coalition has placed emphasis 
on conditionality and responsibility. 
Conditionality has already been 
successfully used in the UK. The Flexible 
New Deal, for example, required people 
who had been on the job seekers allowance 
for 22 months to engage in intensive 
activity periods. This conditionality, 
matched by more intensive support, 
reduced the level and duration of benefit 
receipt. Increases in conditionality have 
also led to reductions in caseloads in the 
US, Denmark, the Netherlands, Australia 
and New Zealand (DWP, 2008). Indeed, 
conditionality has been so successful that 
countries are extending variations of 
these policies to recipients of what were 
previously considered inactive benefits, 
such as lone parents, disabled people and 
people with health conditions.
The second implication is to not lose 
sight of the importance of the labour 
market context. There is a need to not 
just look at the impact of reform at the 
individual or family level but to consider 
how reforms interact with the labour 
market. In the UK the white paper on the 
universal credit contained no indication 
that broader labour market issues have 
been given consideration (Work and 
Pensions Committee, 2011, qn 18). But, 
as Chris Goulden (2010) from the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation has noted, ‘the 
crucial point is that the aim of policy 
should be to promote a good job match 
for all customers. ... This takes us back to 
the flipside of “making work pay” and the 
importance of the labour market – the 
kinds of jobs that are incentivised will 
be vital. It will be no good for long-term 
poverty if the benefits bill is reduced by 
making it easier for people to get stuck 
in cycles of low-paid, unskilled, insecure 
and dead-end jobs.’
The UK experience also highlights 
that the only way to effectively lower 
the cost of welfare is through reducing 
entitlements, especially poorly targeted 
ones. While there is a broad consensus 
across the political spectrum on the 
benefits of having people enter work 
(both for the people themselves and for 
society), the fiscal savings from such 
‘spending to save’ approaches tend to be 
overstated. To make savings, entitlements 
have to be reduced. Yet a risk in making 
these cuts is that they are made in the 
wrong places or in the wrong way.
A criticism that Reform has made of 
the Coalition’s welfare policy is that too 
much emphasis has been given to ‘salami 
slicing’ the main out-of-work benefits, 
while large middle-class benefits have 
remained untouched, particularly the 
poor value-for-money expenditures on the 
elderly (Cawston, Haldenby and Nolan, 
2010). The reason for this is political, 
with the Coalition being unwilling to 
risk a backlash among the large number 
of pensioners who vote. Consequently, 
the principle that spending should be 
cut from those areas that produce least 
value has been lost and the Coalition 
has exposed itself to the challenge that 
it is unfairly targeting segments of the 
working-aged population.
In areas where the Coalition has been 
willing to address the costs of middle-
class welfare, such as by means-testing 
the child benefit, the right thing has 
been done in the wrong way. Means-
testing can create economic cost (such 
as disincentives to work) and compliance 
and administrative burdens, and both 
New Zealand and the UK already have 
overly complex welfare systems. Yet 
the political reluctance to abolish this 
programme means that a half-measure 
approach has been taken and as a result 
the Coalition’s policy (withdrawing the 
child benefit from families with higher-
rate taxpayers) will make complexity 
worse (Cawston, Haldenby and Nolan, 
2010).8 Reducing costs requires removing 
programmes entirely, not merely fine-
tuning them.
The reforms in the UK also highlight 
the importance of changing the way 
assistance is delivered and not just 
the structure of its design. Through 
A major reason for failure has been an 
unwillingness to reduce the generosity of 
entitlements, particularly those to people not  
in need. 
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encouraging the greater involvement of 
private sector and charitable providers 
it is hoped that the provision of welfare-
to-work services will to a greater degree 
reflect local variations in welfare and 
labour market conditions. Taking a 
more creative approach to contracting 
providers could potentially allow 
independent providers to absorb more 
of the risk associated with getting people 
back into work, although the difficulties 
in developing contractual arrangements 
should not be underestimated. If done 
correctly, encouraging profit-making 
firms to enter the welfare-to-work market 
can improve productivity and achieve 
better outcomes at lower costs.
Conclusion
New Zealand and the UK have approached 
welfare reform in relatively similar ways. 
In both countries there has been a greater 
emphasis on conditionality, and efforts 
to make work pay have been pursued 
through the tax credit system. These 
approaches have been consistent with 
those of many other OECD countries, 
where conditionality of benefits has been 
extended to new groups and there has 
been greater use of private sector providers 
and insurance mechanisms, especially for 
disability benefits. Yet in both countries 
approaches of ‘spending to save’ have 
failed to reduce the overall cost of welfare. 
A major reason for failure has been an 
unwillingness to reduce the generosity of 
entitlements, particularly those to people 
not in need. Spending on the elderly has 
proven especially difficult to reduce. The 
need to put welfare on a fiscally sustainable 
footing means that popular spending 
cannot remain outside the value-for-
money agenda. Consideration must be 
given to reforming New Zealand’s state 
pension age, KiwiSaver subsidies, Working 
for Families tax credits (especially the 
parental tax credit) and independent 
earner tax credit.
1 The UK is the sixth largest and New Zealand the 26th largest 
economy in the OECD. On a GDP-per-capita basis the UK 
is 16th and New Zealand 22nd. Although it is important 
to recognise that the OECD is a collection of relatively 
high-income countries, within this group the UK is a middle-
ranked country and New Zealand a low-ranked one.
2 The World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness report 
2010–11 ranked the UK as the 12th most competitive 
economy in the world, down from second in 2006–07. 
The main factors holding back competitiveness were the 
macroeconomic environment and budget deficits. New 
Zealand was ranked 23rd in 2010–11, compared with 21st 
in 2006, largely due to the need to upgrade infrastructure, 
especially roads and the electricity supply.
3 This can be seen most clearly in the UK, which has high 
levels of both household and public debt and is, among 
developed countries, second only to Japan in levels of 
national debt (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). New 
Zealand has lower levels of public borrowing but household 
debt	is	high	(McDonald	et	al.,	2011).	High	levels	of	debt	
make the economy vulnerable to shocks such as a global 
financial	crisis	or	a	natural	disaster.	High	public	debt	also	
crowds out other areas of spending, with, for example, more 
now being spent on servicing debt than on schools in the UK 
(Bassett et al., 2010).
4 The policy objective of reducing child poverty was given 
greater emphasis in the UK, with the goal to eradicate child 
poverty being enshrined in legislation.
5 Other areas of poorly targeted spending in New Zealand 
include KiwiSaver subsidies and the interest free student 
loans policy. Gibson and Le (2008) highlighted that the 
KiwiSaver subsidies represent poor value for money. Only 
a small proportion of each dollar of KiwiSaver balances 
represents new saving. The large majority of these balances 
is ‘either reshuffling amongst existing saving and debt by 
KiwiSaver members, or else taxpayer and employer transfers 
which reduce national saving elsewhere’.
6 Child trust fund, child tax credit, working tax credit, 
education maintenance allowance, local housing allowance, 
sure start maternity grant, child care vouchers, healthy 
start, health in pregnancy grant, winter fuel allowance, 
free TV licences, free bus passes, employment and support 
allowance and the job grant.
7 While, for instance, earned income and ages of children 
could be monitored automatically, criteria such as marital 
status, the length of time a child resides with a caregiver in a 
separated household and hours of work are more difficult to 
keep track of.
8 Rather than withdrawing the child benefit from higher-rate 
taxpayers, commentators such as Reform, the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies and Martin Narey (recent chief executive 
of Barnardo’s) have proposed the simpler approach of 
abolishing the child benefit and compensating lower-income 
families through increasing the generosity of an already 
widely received means-tested programme (the child tax 
credit)	(see	Cawston,	Haldenby	and	Nolan,	2010).
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